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Human judgement and the process of decision making have been
studied in depth for the past century. More recent research has
revealed that feedback is a primary element in the decision making
•
•
process. Feedback has been categorized according to its role in
decision making. Some categories of feedback include cognitive,
feedforward, and outcome. Cognitive feedback may hold the most
promise for positively affecting the decision making process.
Naval Intelligence analysis is a complex process which involves
human judgement and decision making on a daily basis. This thesis
sought to determine that cognitive feedback would enable
intelligence analysts to make optimal choices more consistently
than if they were presented with just outcome feedback. Naval
Intelligence analysts were the subjects of an unclassified
experiment which captured a realistic task performed routinely by
analysts in the Fleet. The experiment revealed that cognitive
feedback produced the most accurate and optimal resul ts / and
indicates that intelligence analysis would benefit from decision
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Research on decision making has reveal ed the rol e of
feedback in affecting the decisions of individuals (Hogarth,
1987). Feedback affects the choice that a decision maker will
make, and can be a crucial el ement in the decision making
process, as it affects both the task environment and the
decision maker's perception of the environment (Hogarth,
1987) .
Feedback can be categorized into several different types,
•
It
including cognitive and outcome feedback. As described by
Jacoby, et aI, 1984,
: .. outcome feedback is information that describes the
accuracy or correctness of the response, cognitive
feedback represents information regarding the how and why
that underlies this accuracy.
A type of feedback which has shown beneficial resul ts is
cognitive feedback (Balzer et aI, 1989). Cognitive feedback
may have particular utility in a complex, probabilistic
environment, where pertinent information, provided to the
decision maker in a timely fashion, can lead to improved
decisions. An exampl e of such an environment is mi I i tary
intelligence analysis. The examination of the effects of
cognitive feedback on intelligence analysts may lend
validation to current beliefs about cognitive feedback, and
1
t
raise additional questions which, when answered, could provide
a basis for future intelligence decision support systems.
B. EXPERIMENTAL TASK
To best capture the effects of cogni ti ve feedback on
intell igence anal ysis, a task speci fi call y designed to capture
the analysis process of analysts in the Navy was devised. The
task was presented to active duty Naval Intelligence analysts
in a format similar to what is used in th~ Fleet. The entire
experiment was unclassified, and the geopolitical scenario was
fictitious, yet effort was taken to design a realistic task
environment that the analysts would be familiar with.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
Previous studies of military intelligence analysts have
revealed that analysts will tend to seek confirmation of their
decisions (Tolcott et aI, 1989). If this confirmation can be
provided in the form of cognitive feedback, will the analysts
use the feedback to reach more correct and optimal decisions?
Does the form of feedback matter, or will there be a
noticeabl e variance between subjects provided wi th and wi thout
cognitive feedback? Answers to these questions were sought
through the design and implementation of the experiment, and
were the focus of this research.
Analysts were randomly divided into two groups: cognitive
feedback and outcome feedback. Each group was presented with
2
the same exact task, but the information presented as feedback
varied, dependent upon which group the analyst was assigned
to. The results of each group were compared to one another,
and the effects of different types of feedback on the analysts
decisions were collected.
D. CONTRIBUTION
The importance of the decision making process to
intelligence analysis is recognized, and the need to determine
which types of feedback are optimal has been previously stated
(Thompson et aI, 1984). This research attempted to further'
determine if cognitive feedback is relevant and beneficial to
the process of intelligence analysis.
Chapter II provides a literature review of research in the
area of intelligence analysis, and lays the theoretical
premise for the study. Chapter III describes in detail the
experimental method. Chapters IV and V discuss statistical
resul ts of the experiment and concl usions drawn from the
experiment, respecti vel y. Resul ts of this study and any
follow-on studies may be used to develop more advanced
decision support system prototypes for the Naval Intelligence
and other military intelligence communities.
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II. THEORETICAL PREMISE
A. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
1. Complexity
Human decision making is a complex process. studies
of this process have revealed that the complexity of decision
making is dependent upon many individual factors such as
intuition, anticipatory tendencies, and judgemental heuristics
(Hogarth, 1987). A 1arge portion of the decision making
process invol ves human memory and the capabi 1i ty, or 1ack
thereof, of the human mind to process information (Hogarth
1979) .
The human being is a fallible decision maker (Hogarth
1979). The human mind is unable to effectively process
continuous information from a mul ti tude of sources, especial 1y
in a stressful environment. A stressful environment places
the human mind in a position to ignore some information and
process other information, dependent upon existing heuristics
(Hogarth, 1987). In applications where decision making is
vital, such as diagnostic medicine and tactical military
scenarios, it is imperative that the information assigned the
least importance is indeed worthy of such a low value.
Each piece of pertinent information contributing to a
decision must be appropriately presented to the decision maker
4
in a manner that will ensure the information is processed with
due value. It is beneficial to fully understand the
importance of information presentation in the decision making
process. This understanding can be accomplished by studying
various decision models as described in subsection II.A.2.
2. Decision Making Models
Researchers have attempted to capture the human
decision making process through observation and mathematical
modeling. Two models of decision making are the conceptual
judgement model (Hogarth, 1987) and the lens model, as
described by Brunswick (Libby, 1981). The conceptual
judgement model and the lens model appear to approach the task
of decision making from the different aspects of psychology
and mathematics. Yet the two models are inextricably linked
by the el ement of feedback, a vi tal part of the decision
making process. Section II.C identifies and defines feedback
and its varieties in more detail. By examining each of these
models a point of departure for this study was attained.
a. Judgemen t Hodel
Hogarth's conceptual judgement model divides the
process of decision making into seven basic steps: (1) task
environment, (2) Schema, (3) Acquisition, (4) Processing, (5)
Output, (6) Action, and (7) Outcome. Step (7), outcome,
provides information that will be pertinent to future
decisions. This outcome of the decision making process is
5
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also considered a form of feedback for future judgmental
scenarios. Hence outcome, or feedback, is a means by which
future judgements can be affected. In becoming pertinent
information to the decision making process, feedback
establishes its vital role in the decision making process.
The conceptual model of human judgement is
depicted in Figure 1. Feedback plays a crucial role in the
judgement process, as it provides criteria to both the task
environment and the judgement schema. The lens model as
interpreted by Brunswick continues the description of the
element of feedback in mathematical detail.
b. The Brunswick Lens Hodel
The Brunswick Lens Model allows the environment to
be observed through a "lens of imperfect cues" (Libby, 1981),
and assigns weights to each of the cues in a specific decision
making scenario. The Lens Model is readily adapted to
situations in which the decision making occurs in a
probabilistic environment, and the accuracy of a decision is
contingent both on the individual decision maker and the
environment in which the decision is made (Hogarth, 1987).
The lens model, as depicted in Figure 2,
represents the differences between actual value weights
assigned to pieces of pertinent information by the






Figure 1. Conceptual Judgement Model (Hogarth, 1987)
7
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pieces of information by the decision maker. These pieces of
information which are considered pertinent to a specific




Figure 2. Brunswick Lens Model (c. f. Dudycha and Naylor
1966; Libby 1981).
The lens model uses identical polynomial equations
for each side of the model; the environment and the decision
..
maker. The differences lie in the assigned values, or
•
weights, for each of the cues. All of the variables used by
the lens model are listed and defined in Table 1.
8




G Matching Index rY.. 'YR'
r 2 Achievement r,..h
First, the lens model attempts to capture the
status of the environment. The environment is represented by
equation 1.
(1 )
Ye, the actual model imposed by the environment, is a
compi 1ati on of the weights (bl .... bn) assigned to the cues
(xl" .xn) by the environment. Likewise, the decision maker's
view of the task is captured in an identical equation, Ys '
wi th the weights (bl •... bn) assigned to the cues (xl'" xn) by
the decision maker.
Both the environment and the decision maker are




then assigned. In the most ideal situation, the decision
•
maker employs consistent weights for specific cues, dependent




other factors that affect the decision-making
process and are thus represented in the lens model include
consistency and environmental noise. Environmental noise is
al so referred to as predi ctabi 1i ty (Libby, 1981). Both
consistency and predictability utilize similar variables in
their calculations.
Rs' consistency, measures how consistent the
decision maker is in predicting the environment. It is
calculated by a multiple correlation between the cues and the
decision maker's judgements.
Re, predictability, measures how predictable the
environment is. If noise or predictability is low, the
probability of the decision maker attaining a reasonable task
accuracy is low (Libby, 1981). Predictability can be
calculated by employing a multiple correlation of the cues and
the actual environmental values.
The accuracy of decisions can be measured through
the lens model, in the form of decision achievement, r a •
Ia=GReRs
(2 )
Consistency, Rs ' and predictability, Re, can be calculated to
determine the overall accuracy of the decisions made by the
decision maker. Decision achievement is an indication of how
10
well an individual, Ys ' matches the environment, Ye , through
this "lens of imperfect cues" (Libby, 1981).
The Brunswik Lens Model lends well to the process
executed by Naval Intelligence and Cryptological analysts. By
examining the analyst's decision and mathematically comparing
it to the environment's actual outcome, an index of
achievement for intelligence analysts can be arrived at for a
t-
specific type of analysis task. The effects of various
factors, such as feedback, on the decision making process, can
be examined by comparative analysis of achievement indices for
multiple instances of a generic task.
B. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS A DECISION MAKING PROCESS
While intelligence analysis can be a complex decision
making process involving human judgement, intelligence
analysis has not been "intensively investigated by
psychologists for more than thirty years" in the manner human
judgement and decision making have been (Tolcott et al 1989).
A prel iminary 1i terature review reveals somewhat sporadic
research in the area of intell igence anal ysis, wi th the
majority of the material focused on developing decision
support aids for the intelligence analyst .
•
In 1974 Patten attempted to initiate a method of
organizing data and information received by an intelligence
system to help analysts. Patten's concern was the following:
11
..
•[that] intelligence analyst[s] working on specific
problems must be able to selectively obtain information
relevant to a specific problem without becoming bogged
down in irrelevant information." (Patten, 1974)
Patten's study focused on the information and data relevant to
the analysis process, but not the analysis process itself .
sticha, Patterson, and Weiss researched ,and determined
Approximate Reasoning Methods for Decision Aids in 1982, which
I ed to the development of· a prototype decision aid for Ai r
Force target nomination. The reason for studying approximate
reasoning methods was to hopefully" ... achieve a system that
could facilitate an intelligence analyst's efforts" (sticha et
aI, 1982). Hence, the actual intelligence analysis process
became the focus of the research.
An Intelligence Aid for Estimating Enemy Courses of Action
(AI!ENCOA) was developed in 1985 in an attempt to provide
cognitive support to intelligence analysts by altering
decision rule bases (Lehner et al 1985). AI/ENCOA software
was developed as a prototype decision aid to assist Army
tactical intell igence anal ysts assigned wi th choosing feasibl e
enemy courses of action. This prototype uti I ized Mul ti-
...
Attribute utility (MAU) models and enabled the analyst to
assign weights to each alternative.
Another decision support software package created for Army
intell igence anal ysts was DINAA: The Dynamic Intell igence
Assessment Aid, by Probus and Donnell, in 1986. DINAA allowed
the analyst to determine probabi 1i ties for each avenue of
12
approach as determined by AI/ENCOA. DINAA utilized Bayes'
theorem to adjust and assess probabilities. The Prototype
Analyst Workstation (PAWS) developed in 1990 was similar to
AI/ENCOA in that it allowed the analyst to define alternative
courses of action open to the enemy, with the aid of MAU (D.
Thompson et al, 1990).
Cohen, Laskey, and Tolcott developed a prototype decision
aid in 1987 that could be personalized for each user.
Submarine commanders were used as the subjects, and the idea
that
individual decision makers differ both among
themselves and from task to task in the
decision strategy they prefer (Cohen et al,
1987)
was examined. This "personalized and prescriptive" decision
aid allowed the submarine commander to examine di fferent
decision methods, weights, and trade-offs for each decision.
Tolcott, Marvin and Lehner conducted research in 1989 in
" ... an at tempt to further the investigation of cogni ti ve
behavi or under! ying intell igence analysis" (Tol cot t et al /
1989). This study revealed that an intelligence analyst will
tend to "[remain} with [his/her] original estimate" of a
scenario, regardless of update information presented (Tolcott
•
et al, 1989). I t appears as though mi I i tary intell igence
...
analysts will " ... pay more attention to supportive than to
contradictory evidence /" as it pertains to their original




elicited another research question: if update information
could be defined as feedback, and if feedback could be further
delineated into different types of feedback, would an
analyst's perception of update information, or feedback, be
affected by the specific type of feedback provided? This
question is addressed in section II.C, Feedback and. its Role
in the Decision Making Process.
1. Decision Making and Intelligence Analysis
The process of intelligence analysis is comparable to
the standard decision making process but even more pronounced
due to the high levels of stress, dynamic environments, and
the crucial nature of the decisions arrived at. After
evaluating large amounts of incoming data (Adelman et aI,
1984), the analyst must "provide information on which
commanders' deci si ons are made," val ida ting the anal ys ts '
position as a critical one in the chain of intelligence and
operational events (Lewis and Copeland, 1982). It is clearly
recognized that the analyst routinely faces an intricate and
complex task that may be gargantuan in its proportions (Luckie
et al 1968). Essentially, the analyst is tasked with
repeatedly "quantifying assessed probabilities" (Probus and
Donnell, 1986). Very often, the analyst is relying solely on
intuitive feelings, with little or no substantiated feedback
on his/her decision making process.
14
2. Intelligence Analysis as a Process
Naval Intelligence analysis utilizes the decision
making process. Intelligence analysis can therefore be
studied with the lens model and conceptual judgement model,
and may yield improved performance results with the provision
of feedback to the analyst. Effective intelligence analysis
can be defined as an internal, concept-driven process vice an
external, data-driven process (Katter et aI, 1979), and thus,
as an internal process, has the needs of conceptual judgement,
including feedback (Hogarth, 1987).
The intelligence analyst is continually faced with making
probabi 1i ty assessments concerning both categorical events
and events which lie along a continuum (Barclay and
Randall, 1975).
Therefore the decisi on making process used by the anal yst
could be ideally studied with the aid of Brunswik's
interpretation of the lens model.
C. FEEDBACK AND ITS ROLE IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Technically, feedback is the process by which an
environment returns to individuals a portion of the
information in their response output necessary to compare
their process strategy with a representation of an ideal
strategy (Balzer et aI, 1989)
Feedback, as pictured simplistically by Hogarth in his
conceptual judgement model, is essential to the decision
making process. Feedback is relevant to the decision making
process and it is widely accepted that
Bet ter performing individuals woul d be more I ikel y to
access and use feedback information (Jacoby et aI, 1984)
15
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It is fair to conclude from this that feedback could play an
important role in improving intelligence analysis. There are
many varieties of feedback, such as outcome and cognitive.
What types of feedback will best suit the process of
intelligence analysis? The answer becomes clear when the two
most basic types of feedback, outcome and cogni ti ve, are
examined.
1. Outcome Feedback
Outcome feedback is the most basic type of feedback,
and can be described as the results of a decision process that
has al ready occurred. The resul ts are the outcome( s) of
decisions previously made; hence outcome feedback of a current
decision does not facilitate changing or altering the current
decision. Outcome feedback provides information on previous
decisions only; current decisions are unaffected by outcome
feedback from their results. Outcome feedback has been
challenged for its validity as a type of feedback, as it can
only enhance future decisions vice the current decision making
process (Balzer et al 1989). Several research studies
demonstrate that outcome feedback may have little to no
utility in an uncertain learning environment (Balzer et al
1989) . Hence, outcome feedback may not be optimal in the
intelligence analysis environment, as intelligence analysis
frequently occurs in an uncertain environment.
16
2. Cognitive Feedback
Cognitive feedback provides the decision maker with
information about the decision currently being made.
Cogni ti ve feedback allows the decision maker to know what
their consistency rating is, what weights they have assigned
to cues, and what weights the environment has assigned to the
cues. Cogni ti ve feedback consists of three el ements; Task
Information (TI), Cognitive Information (CI), and Functional
Validity Information (FVI) (Balzer et al 1989). Cognitive
Feedback provides what outcome feedback cannot: information
on the decision making process as it occurs. "Whereas outcome
feedback is information that describes the accuracy or
correctness of the response, cogni ti ve feedback represents
information regarding the how and why that underl ies this
accuracy" (Jacoby et aI, 1984).
Naval Intelligence analysis occurs in a very dynamic
environment. Since it has been suggested that outcome
feedback is dysfunctional in a dynamic environment (Jacoby et
al 1984), and that the type of feedback believed to be most
beneficial, most often, is indeed cognitive (Balzer et al
1989), perhaps the feedback with the highest utility for Naval
intell igence and cryptological anal ysts could be cogni ti ve
feedback. Cogni ti ve feedback appears to hold promise for
improving the quality of intelligence analysis. This could be
of the utmost importance since many decisions made by analysts




Because of the importance of decision making
in intell igence anal ysis, it is imperative
that more research be devoted to the types of
decisions that analysts have to make ... what
are optimum feedback mechanisms? (Thompson et
al,1984)
This research examined the following hypotheses in an effort
to answer the previous question:
Cogni ti ve feedback is more effective than outcome feedback
in intelligence analysis tasks.
Intelligence analysts provided with cognitive feedback
during their decision making process wi 11 exhibit improved
performance and will make optimal vice satisficing
decisions.
The research question was examined through an experiment,
using Brunswik's interpretation of the lens model and
mathematical analysis.
It was imperative to first determine whether or not the
subjects were affected by cognitive feedback in any way.
Further· anal ysis determined exactl y how the anal ysts were
affected: positively, in that they were making more accurate
and consistent decisions; or negatively, in that they were
making decisions which were increasingly inaccurate and
inconsistent with previous decisions. The effect of cognitive
feedback on Naval Intelligence and Cryptological analysts was




Naval Intelligence analysts make complex decisions on a
dai I y basis, whether their anal ysis is as an individual
analyst for an operational command such as a squadron or ship,
or they are part of a large watchstanding team that
colI ecti vel y anal yzes data for the Department of Defense
(DOD). Naval Intell igence anal ys is routinel y invol ves compI ex
decision making and provides a viable arena for examining the
ef f ects of cogni ti ve feedback on compl ex decisi on making
processes.
The research question was investigated in an experimental
setting designed to most closely represent the type of
decisions made by analysts in the Fleet. A realistic and
fairlY complex task of moderate to difficult complexity was
created in an effort to employ the broadest range of the
analyst's decision making capabilities.
B. Experimental Design
An experiment involving comparison of results between two
sets of subjects was devised. One set of subjects (12
subjects) was given outcome feedback only; another set (12
19
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sub j ects) was gi ven cogni ti ve and outcome feedback. The
presentation of feedback was designed to provide an optimal
amount of information to the subject with minimal complexity
in the presentation format.
The subjects for each part of the experiment were randomly
assigned to receive outcome or outcome and cognitive feedback.
Subjects receiving cognitive feedback had a longer instruction
set to read and understand before they were able to begin the
experiment. Outcome feedback was presented as accuracy,
whereas cognitive feedback was presented as Decision Support
Information. Both types of feedback, and how they were
designed and presented to the subject, are described in the
following sections.
C. PARTICIPANTS
Subjects chosen for this experiment were all on active
duty in the United States Navy. They are currently serving,
or have served, in positions requiring intelligence or
cryptologic analysis. Both Enlisted Personnel and Commissioned
Officers were used in the experiment. All subjects have
received training by U.S. Navy schools, and have had
experience at making intelligence decisions. The actual
positions and billets held by the experiment's subjects
varied, from operational intelligence billets afloat, to
standard administrative-type billets ashore.
20
TABLE 2. EXPERIMENT SUBJECT DEMOGRAPHICS
Demographic Mean Standard Deviation
Age (years) 29.0 7.0
Rank (E-l through 9.0 (E-9) 3.7
0-9)
Analysis Experience 5.5 4.6
(years)




The subject demographics were calculated with the
assistance of Minitab (Schaefer and Anderson, 1989).
D. TASK
The task of "quantifying assessed probabilities" (Probus
and Donnell, 1986) to various cues or pieces of information is
central to the intelligence analyst's decision making process.
Thisis academi call y and professi onall y acknowl edged as a
difficult task, and has been examined and incorporated into
the development of di fferent systems to aid intell igence
anal ysis, such as The Dynamic Intell igence Assessment Aid
(DINAA) designed by Probus and Donnell in 1986; and described
in the User's Manual for the Prototype Anal yst Workstation
(PAWS) by Thompson, et al, in 1990. Both DINAA and PAWS
represent attempts to first capture, and then aid, the process
of intelligence analysis. This highlights the first challenge
faced when attempting to prove the hypothesis of this study:
the experiment must include a task similar in complexity to
21
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the task performed by a Naval Intelligence analyst on a daily
basis. The validity of the experiment hinged upon the data
collected from the analysts, and the data could only be as
realistic and meaningful as the task itself.
1. Selection of Task
The task of intelligence analysis requires the analyst
to provide a decision based upon whatever information is
available. To represent this task and ensure the robustness
of the experiment, a task similar to that performed by
anal ysts in the Fl eet was devised. The task requires the
analyst, or subject, to provide his/her best estimate of a
suspect ship's position, based upon given information. The
given information was dependent upon whether or not the
subject had access to solely outcome feedback, or cognitive
and outcome feedback.
2. Description of Task
The actual task presented to the analysts involved an
anti-drug smuggling situation. Anti-drug smuggling tasking
was chosen due to its relevancy in military operations and
intelligence. The task was first presented to the analyst
from a political standpoint of the situation in the Background
Information. The Background Information provided current
domestic and international political and social information as
it pertained to the influx of illegal drugs into the United
states. The purpose of the Background Information was to
22
create a basis of familiarity for the analyst, and to give the
task a realistic perspective.
The task was reduced to a singl e si tuation, simi 1ar to
the analysts daily tasks in the Fleet, in the Situation Report
and Scenario, both which narrowed the scope of the illegal
drug trafficking trade to a single suspect vessel. The
anal yst was asked to provide his/her best estimate of the
location of the suspect vessel based upon the information
provided.
Basic information provided on the suspect vessel
included that it had completed three previous runs from
Colombia to the u.s. over the past six weeks, tracking east of
Cuba the first time, and west of Cuba the last two times. The
analyst was told the vessel was estimated to carry up to three
tons of cocaine, and that it was preparing to depart Colombia
once again for the u.s. mainland. This basic information on
the suspect vessel provided the analyst with a brief history
of the vessel, the general geographic location of the
scenario, and an idea of the vessel's drug carrying
capability.
3. Task Variables/Cues
A real isti c task necessi ta tes variabl es and random
weighting of the variabl es. This task incorporated four
variables: weather, ship type/speed, presence of the Cuban
Navy, and the last contact information on the suspect vessel.
23
•All four variables were present throughout the task; thus the
analyst had information regarding each of the four variables
each time he/she was asked to perform the task of providing an
estimated suspect vessel position. Each variable appeared to
be weighted differently in each scenario presented to the
analyst, and the combination of the differently weighted
variables varied as well. This was to provide as realistic a
task as possible, and to optimally test the analysts decision
making capabili ties. However, the actual posi tion of the
ship, as calculated by the system, weighted the ship
type/speed, weather, and last contact variables equally and
inc 1uded a random error. The proximi ty of the Cuban Navy
variable was negligible in the calculation of the ship's
actual position. The values used for each of the variables as
presented to the analysts are represented in Table 3.
24




Ship Sailboat (6-8 knots) \
Type/Speed Yawl (10-12 knots)
Cargo Ship (19-20 knots)
•Speedboat (40+ knots)
Sea State 1 = Calm, winds up to 10 knots
2 = Breezy, winds up to 20 knots
3 = Heavy swells, winds up. to 45
knots
4 = Hurricane force, gale winds
up to 80 knots
Cuban Navy 20 nautical mile radius
in Area 15 nautical mile radius
10 nautical mile radius
3 nautical mile radius
E. PRESENTATION
1. Task Description/Information
All sub jects, regardl ess of the type of feedback
provided to them, recei ved the same basic information to
enhance the naturalness of the experiment. Background
Information and Situation Report provided geopolitical
information on the areas of concern for DOD and the United
states Government. In this experiment, Background Information
stated that the focus of the President is on the anti-drug
efforts of the U.s. This set the stage for the scenario in
which the subject was asked to provide a position for the
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rsuspect vessel. Scenario provided information as to what
billet the subject was to place him/herself in, and for what
purpose they were to provide an estimated posi tion of the
suspect vessel.
Pn keeping with the experimental rule of "ten
scenari os per cue" (Bal zer and Doherty, 1991), the anal ys twas
asked to provide an estimated position of the suspect vessel
forty separate times during the experiment. Each scenario was
independent of any other, and incorporated the four variables,
or cues, provided to the subject. The four variabl es were
last contact, ship type/speed, weather, and cuban Naval
exercise proximity to the location of the suspect vessel. The
actual values of each variable (hours, knots, sea state,
proximity of Cuban Navy in nautic.al miles) were varied in each
scenario. Thus each scenario used the same four variables,
but in a different combination of values for each instance.
Variables were presented to the analysts in the form
of message sets, which are very fami I iar to intell igence
personnel. An example of a message set is in the Appendix.
Since the entire experimental scenario and background
information was unclassified, so were the message sets, the
origin of each message, and its destination.
The four variables; last contact, ship type/speed,
weather, and Cuban Naval activity proximity to the suspect
vessel, were all presented in the message set. The analyst
was presented with forty message sets in total, each formatted
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identical to the sample message set in the Appendix, but with
the values of the cues, or variables, randomly varied.
2. Geographic Representation
The task was designed to best represent the tasks
performed by analysts on a daily basis in the Fleet. The task
asked the analyst for his/her best estimate of the suspect
vessel's position, based upon the information presented in the
respecti ve message set. In a rea 1 si t uati on, the anal yst
would be asked to provide an estimated position in degrees
1a ti tude and 1ongi tude. To provide a more straightforward
representation of the task and also to place necessary limits
on the pertinent geographic area of the task, a grid square
was designed to cover the geographic area of the experiment.
The analyst was asked to locate the suspect vessel in
an area in the Caribbean, north of Colombia and Venezuela.
The geographic area of the task is depicted in the Appendix.
The grid square was bounded by the following four coordinates:
12N 72W; 18N 72W; 12N 78W; 18N 78W. The grid square was
divided into thirty-six smaller squares, and each square was
approximately sixty by sixty nautical miles. Each square was
assigned a two-digit, unique number. This allowed for greater
ease in providing a position, and thus greater ease in
calculations involving the positions of the suspect vessel.
The grid square did not, however, detract from the continuous
nature of the latitudinal and longitudinal scales of
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measurement. Continuous values for the position(s) of the
suspect vessel were preserved with the grid square as each
position remained unique and numerically higher or lower than
any other grid square. The grid square numbering maintained
the continuity of the number line.
What was most realistic in the experimental setting
was that the message sets presented mul tiple cues to the
subjects in a format familiar to the subjects. This enhanced
the viability of the results captured by the experiment, as it
allowed the analysts to complete a task as familiar as
possible to them. Experiment debriefing revealed that nearly
every subject believed the experiment and task to be highly
realistic and believable.
F. SETTING
Subjects received experiment Background Information,
Scenario, Si tuation Report, Message Sets, Computer Instruction
Set, and Decision Support Information manually, in a loose-
leaf binder. The experimenter presented the subject with the
binder after briefly explaining the geographical area of the
experiment with the aid of a navigational chart. Background
Information, Scenario, Situation Report, and Message Sets were
described in sections III.D and III.E. Computer Instruction
Set and Decision Support Information wi 11 be described in this
section, and section III.G, respectively.
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1. Geographic Area
A navigational chart identical to those used in the
Fleet by analysts conducting actual tasks was provided, with
the task area delineated in grid format. Thirty-six squares,
approximately 60 nautical miles X 60 nautical miles each, were
numbered to represent a continuous scale similar to latitude
and longitude. Each square was unique. The grid-square
numbering system allowed for greater ease in statistical
analysis without detracting from the actual continuous
latitude/longitude system employed in the Fleet.
The geographic area of the experiment, defined by the
grid square, was covered with acetate to allow marking of the
area by the ana 1ys t wi th a water sol ubI e marker. Rul ers or
navigational plotters/dividers were provided to the subject
for distance calculation.
Each subject was provided with a piece of scrap paper
and a pencil or pen for any time-distance calculations
required. Calculators were not permitted as a general rule.
2. System
The experiment was conducted on IBM compatible 286/386
computers, in private office or computer laboratory areas.
Each subject was given a one page Computer Instruction Set
which explained the screen on which the vessel's estimated
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•posi tion, in the form of a grid square number, would be
entered. Instructions on how to receive outcome or cognitive
feedback were included in the appropriate instruction set.
Additional computer instructions were presented to the
subject on the screen of the computer they were using,
reminding the analyst to consider each message set
individually, and to enter each two-digit estimated position
of the suspect vessel into the computer after they had
analyzed each message set. The last instruction on the screen
directed the subject to "strike any key when ready," upon
which time the four-col umn screen for posi tion entry was
displayed on the monitor.
3. Data Capture/Entry
The system captured the subject's estimated positions
when the subject entered their estimated position for each
message set. The subject was presented wi th a monochrome
screen with four columns of ten entry places each. To the
greatest extent possible, a graphical display was used that
had been found to be effective for approximate comparison of
quantitative information (Brehmer, 1984). The entry places
for the subject's estimated positions were numbered 1-40, and
further computer instruction information was presented on the
bottom line of the screen. The columns for data entry
covered the bottom-half of the screen. The top-half of the
screen remained blank for subjects receiving outcome feedback
30
only. When the subjects receiving solely outcome feedback
pressed "END," they were presented with the actual position of
the the suspect vessel (accuracy, or r a,) in the right hand
columns next to their estimated vessel position.
The subjects receiving cognitive feedback were presented
with a menu after they pressed "END." The menu was displayed
in the top half of the screen. After choosing a cognitive or
outcome feedback option, the subject participating in the
cognitive feedback experiment was provided with decision rule
scales in the top half of the screen, or consistency and/or
accuracy information in the columns preceding or following the
estimated position entry column.
An experimenter was present for the entire length of the
experiment, to provide guidance to the subjects and ensure
proper task compl etion by the subjects. The subjects were
given no time limit for completing the forty tasks involved in
the experiment. Subjects took anywhere from 50 minutes to 135
minutes to complete the experiment.
G. DESIGN OF FEEDBACK
1. Outcome Feedback
In the experiment version that incorporated outcome
feedback only, the computer instruction set indicated that the
analyst could access outcome feedback, in the form of the
suspect ship's actual position, by pressing the "END" key on
the keyboard. Once the subject had accessed outcome feedback,
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•he/she was unable to change any positions he/she had already
entered.
In the experiment incorporating both outcome and
cognitive feedback, the analyst was able to access their
accuracy, or outcome feedback, by sel ecting the "accuracy"
menu choice on the feedback menu.
Outcome feedback was presented in similar fashion to
the subjects for both sets of the experiment. When the
subject accessed "accuracy," the outcome feedback was
displayed, in the form of a two-digit suspect vessel position,
as estimated by the system. The system's estimate of the
suspect vessel's posi ti on appeared in the right-hand col umn of
the data-entry screen, next to the suspect vessel's position
estimated by the subject. The outcome feedback, in the format
of "accuracy," is displayed in Figure 3.
Outcome feedback, or accuracy, was calculated with the
use of consistency and predictability information.
2. Cognitive Feedback
All subjects conducting the outcome and cogni ti ve
version of the experiment received an additional instruction
set, Decision Support Information, which detailed the five















Flgure 3. Outcome Feedback Displayed as Accuracy
(Sengupta, 1990)
To access both cognitive and outcome feedback, the
analyst pressed the "END" key, which then provided them with
a menu of information feedback options. Choices numbered 1
through 5 on the menu provided cognitive feedback information.
Choice number 6 provided outcome feedback, in the form of
accuracy, as described in the previous subsection.
The experimental model required that the analyst had
provided positions for at least 15 message sets before any of
the cognitive feedback options could be accessed. Cognitive
feedback information was presented to the subject in the
following formats:
1. Decision Rule Information: This provided specific weights
assigned to the variables by the analyst for the previous
scenarios which the analyst had provided an estimated
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position for. This function would reveal to the subject
which of the variables they were placing the most and
least values on to make their decision. The calculation
of the weights assigned to the variables was accomplished
by the following method (as in Sengupta, 1990):
(a) Weights assigned to the vari abl es were cal cuI a ted by
a multiple regression of variable values and the analyst's
estimation of the weights.
(b) The weights were then transformed into a percentage
representation of the total value of the weights.
(c) The weights, transformed into percentages, were then









Vessel type ... Last contact 111111 Sea state • Cuban Navy .~
Figure 4. Analyst's Decision Weights (Sengupta, 1990)
2 . Consistency Information: This function provided the
subject with the positions they would have chosen for the
suspect vessel if they were indeed applying their decision
rule consistently. As with choice one, Decision Rule
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Information, only the message sets for which the analysts
had provided an estimated position could be given
correlated consistency positions. Consistency was
..
•
calculated by a multiple correlation between the variables
and the analyst's estimation of the weights of the
variables. Consistency was presented to the analyst on
the data entry menu, in the left-hand column next to the
analyst's estimated suspect vessel positions. An example




1 34 34 35
2 21 22 21
3 25 25 23
4 52 53 54
5 46 45 44





Figure 5. Consistency Information (Sengupta, 1990)
3. Information on the System's Decision Rule: This function
provided the subject with the actual weights for each
variable, or cue, as applied by the system, to achieve the
correct, or system, answer. This was cal cuI a ted in a
manner similar to Decision Support Information, but the
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multiple regression was between the actual weights of the
variabl es, and the assigned val ues of the variabl es.
Information on the system's decision rule was represented
on a horizontal bar graph.
4. Information on the System's and the Subject's Decision
Rule: a combination of choices one and three, this
function allowed the subject to graphically compare
his/her applied decision weights with the weights utilized
by the system.
5. Information on the Subject's Decision Rule and
Consistency: a combination of choices one and two, this
function presented the subject wi th both the weights
he/she was utilizing, as well as his/her degree of
consistency.
6. Accuracy: this function served as the outcome portion of
this version's feedback, as it provided the subject with
the actual vessel position. As in the outcome feedback
only version of the experiment, once the subject accessed
accuracy, or outcome feedback, he/she was not able to




The statistical analysis of the experiment supports the
hypotheses by reveal ing that the anal ysts presented wi th
cognitive feedback and outcome feedback performed
significantly better than the analysts who received outcome
feedback only. Hence, cognitive feedback impacted the
intelligence analysis process pertinent to the experimental
task in a positive manner.
An immediate and clear measure of the performance of the
analysts is represented in Table 4.
TABLE 4. MEANS AND (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF PERFORMANCE
TYPE OF r a Rs GFEEDBACK
Cognitive .841 (.106) .914 (.068) .967 (.041)
Feedback
Outcome .658 (.192) .811 (.077) .717 (.180)
Feedback
The measures of performance are the achievement index, or
accuracy, r a' the consistency index, Rs ' and the matching
index, G. In all three measures, the analysts receiving
cogni ti ve feedback performed markedl y better than the anal ysts
receiving outcome feedback only.
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To more cl osel y examine these resul ts, an anal ysis of
variance (ANOVA) amongst the performance factors was
conducted. This was calculated using the General Linear
Models procedure in SAS (SAS, 1987). The results are shown in
Table 5.
TABLE 5. ANOVA OF MODEL AND (ERROR)
Dependent Degrees Sum of Mean F Value Pr > F
Variables of Squares Square
Freedom
r a 1 (22) 4.720 0.079 4.05 0.0001(1.904) (0.019)
Rs 1 (22) 0.624 0.010 2.56 0.0001(0.398) (0.004)
G 1 (22) 2.606 0.043 2.16 0.0003
(1.968) (0.020)
The results indicate that subjects receiving cognitive
feedback had a significantly higher achievement score than
those receiving outcome feedback (F(1,22) = 4.05; p < 0.0001).
Subjects recei ving cogni ti ve feedback had a signi ficant I y
higher consistency score than those receiving outcome feedback
only (F(1,22) = 2.56; p < 0.0001). Subjects receiving
cognitive feedback also had a significantly higher matching
index than those receiving outcome feedback only (F(1,22) =
2.16; p < 0.0003). We thus conclude that subjects receiving
cognitive feedback performed better than those receiving
outcome feedback only. The null hypothesis is, therefore,
..










The debriefing questionnaires and task block surveys
revealed information on the subjects perceptions of the
experiment. Overall, the anal ysts found the task to be
difficult, and felt that it moderately resembled a task they
had previously performed in the Fleet. Subjects found the
task to be clear, and took the experiment very seriously.
Analysts who received cognitive feedback found it to be
moderatel y helpful, and all subjects fel t that the outcome




The purpose of this study was to evaluate the efficacy of
cognitive feedback in improving intelligence analysts'
performance. The statistical results of the experiment
indicate that analysts who received cognitive feedback did
indeed perform better than their colleagues who received only
outcome feedback.
B. CONTRIBUTION
Evidence thus indicates that cognitive feedback positively
impacts performance. The significance of this study is that
it invol ved U. S. Naval Intell igence and Cryptologic personnel,
and indicates that cognitive feedback could be beneficial to
more types of intell igence analysis. For example,
intelligence analysts tracking a suspect vessel would be able
to receive information on the significance of the cues in the
particular environment in which they are working
(environmental weights). Analysts could have, at a glance, a
•
summary of the emphasis that they have been placing on various
cues in a particular problem (decision weights). Analysts
could also access information relating how consistent their
choices are (consistency). One or all of these added tools to
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the environment of intelligence analysis could, be beneficial
and lead to improved analysis results.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research could use this study as a point of
departure to determine which forms of cognitive feedback are
most beneficial to intelligence analysis. This could lead to
the development of a Decision Support System prototype for
U.S. Naval Intelligence activities.
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1. The purpose of
Intelligence Officers
information.




2. Your participation in this experiment is voluntary and
the results of your participation will be used for research
purposes only. Please take the experiment seriously and
attempt to answer the queries as realistically as possible.
B. Your Task
1. Your task involves three basic steps. They are:
a. Read the background information for your scenario
provided in your task booklet. You may need to read it over
two or three times before you feel thoroughly comfortable with
it. The scenario will provide information regarding the task
you are asked to perform. For example, you will be told the
history of a particul ar drug-smuggl ing ship that you wi 11
later be asked to provided an estimated location for.
b. Examine, individually, each of the 40 message packages
provided. Each message set is on a separate piece of paper
and consists of three "messages" similar to those you use in
the Fleet. The scenario will take place in the Caribbean.
Each message set will provide information on the ship's
type/speed, the last contact (in hours), weather in the
Caribbean, and Cuban Naval presence in the vicinity of the
suspect vessel.
A typical message set is composed of three messages
whose bodies of information appear as follows:
"SUSPECT SHIP LOCATED 15 HOURS AGO IN THE VICINITY OF GRID
SQUARE # 373, TRAVELING AT 3 KTS."
"WEATHER REPORT FOR 15 JANUARY: CLEAR SKIES, WINDS FROM




"CUBAN NAVAL UNITS SIGHTED WITHIN 1 NM OF SUSPECT VESSEL."
c. After you read and analyze each message set, you are
to provide a grid square position number of where you best
estimate the target unit to be located. You will use the
chart provided and the navigation set to determine this.
REMEMBER--each message set is independent of all others,
hence you will estimate a new position for each message set.
You will complete two blocks of 40 queries, for a total of
80 position estimates.
d. This is a not a simple task and the answer may not
seem "easy" to arrive at. Do not get discouraged, and
remember that you were chosen for this experiment because of
your expertise at decision-making in a complex environment.
2. Please read the computer instructions carefully. You will
receive the scenario background information and message
packages manually, and enter your estimated position into the
computer. You may also be able to use the information on the
computer to receive feedback on your decisions, and this will
be specified in the computer instructions.
3. After you complete the entire task (both blocks), please
fill out the debrief questionnaire and the demographic
information sheet provided. Please be honest and as clear as





* You wi 11 be presented wi th four col umns on your screen.
There are ten rows in each column, one for each message set,
for a total of forty message sets per block.
* The message sets will be presented manually. Each set is on
a separate piece of paper. The message sets incorporate
information that will enable you to estimate the target ship's
location. Specifically, you will be given information on the
ship type/speed, last contact (in hours), weather, and Cuban
Naval presence in the area.
* You can enter your grid square number choice for each
message set next to the appropriate message set number. You
need not analyze the message sets in any particular order.
You can maneuver about the screen with the cursor. The "up"
and "down" arrows allow you to se I ect the message sets you
choose to analyze, and also allow you to change answers if you
choose to.
* At anytime during the experiment you may access decision
support information on the accuracy your decision making
process. Simply press "END" and a decision support
information menu will be presented to you at the top portion
of your screen. You may select up to six different types of
feedback, but once you chose feedback that displ ays the
accuracy of your decisions, you may not change any decisions
already completed. You will receive further information on





rule information requires that you
10 posi tions before you can access
have
this
* After you have completed Block One, complete the Block One
Questionnaire and press "HOME" to move to Block Two.
* After Block TWO, complete the Block Two questionnaire, the
task debrief survey, the demographic information sheet, and
inform the experimenter that you are finished.
* The line at the bottom of the screen will provide you with
information on how to maneuver about the screen and how to
receive additional information.
* IF AT ANYTIME DURING THE EXPERIMENT YOU ARE NOT SURE OF HOW





* You wi 11 be presented wi th four col umns on your screen.
There are ten rows in each column, one for each message set,
for a total of forty message sets per block.
* The message sets will be presented manually. Each set is on
a separate piece of paper. The message sets incorporate
information that will enable you to estimate the target ship's
location. Specifically, you will be given information on the
ship type/speed, last contact (in hours), weather, and Cuban
Naval presence in the area.
* You can enter your grid square number choice for each
message set next to the appropriate message set number. You
need not analyze the message sets in any particular order.
You can maneuver about the screen with the cursor. The "up"
and "down" arrows allow you to sel ect the message sets you
choose to analyze, and also allow you to change answers if you
choose to.
* At anytime during the experiment you may find out what the
correct answers were for message sets you have already
completed. By pressing "END" you will be provided with the
"correct" ship positions. Once you access this information,
you may not change any answers you have already entered.
* After you have completed Block One, complete the Block One
questionnaire and press HOME" to move to Block Two.
* After Block Two, complete the Block Two questionnaire, the
task debrief survey, the demographic information sheet, and
inform the experimenter that you are finished.
* The line at the bottom of the screen will provide you with
information on how to maneuver about the screen and how to
receive additional information.
* IF AT ANYTIME DURING THE EXPERIMENT YOU ARE NOT SURE OF HOW




The United states has been fighting the drug war for over
three years, yet the effectiveness of the war is questionable.
The Presidential election is only one year away, and the
current administration wishes to ensure continual funding for
the anti-drug effort.
World politics have taken a backseat to domestic issues.
The current administration realizes that domestic policy has
not been its strong suit in the press, as presented to the
American people. One issue that is repeatedly
spotlighted by the media is that of the "crack babies" being
born to cocaine addicted mothers, at an alarming rate. Crack
babies are not just born in the inner-city ghetto atmosphere,
but to mothers of all social strata in the U.s. Recent news
commentaries have revealed that the importation of cocaine and
crack into the U.s. is at an all time high. Congress is
beginning to ask what is going on with the drug war.
Senior military officials know that their anti-drug
campaign has been relatively successful and fruitful. In
light of the small number of u.s. armed forces dedicated to
the anti-drug campaign, the total amount of captured
contra-band is pheI:'lomenal. But in comparison to the total
amount of cocaine and crack smuggled into the u.s. annually,
it is barely the tip of the iceberg.
The President saw a need to step up the intensity of the
drug war. He elicited advice from his top military personnel
regarding just how much military hardware and personnel would
be needed to accompl ish this. Then, the President went to
Congress with the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation
and presented a proposal to attempt to finally put a noose on
the cocaine flow from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The
country of chief concern is Colombia, since drugs harvested in
Peru and Bol i via are transported through Col umbia and then
flown or shipped to the U.s.
Situation Report 10 November 1991
In a sweeping rna jori ty· last week, Congress voted to
increase the budget for the drug war ten-fold. This increase
was voted in under the conception of the American people that
the war could now be tackled in a short period of time and put





You are on watch in the Joint Team Against Drugs Command
in Florida. Pressure has been increasing for your watch team
to get the best intelligence possible out to the Fleet surface
and air units who are responsible for patrolling marked areas
in the Caribbean.
You have received intelligence indicating that a vessel
capabl e of carrying three tons of cocaine is preparing to
depart Colombia for the U.S. mainl and. A history of this
vessel reveals that it has completed three runs from Colombia
to the u.s. in the last six weeks. Its tracks were around the
eastern edge of Cuba the first time, then around the western
edge the last two times. Track navigation took 4 days each
time.
You are directed to provide the most likely area the
vessel is at the current time. Taking into consideration the
information provided in the most recent message traffic, in
what area would you send the aircrews and ships? It is
current 1y 11 Nov and you need to estimate the vessel's
position. Please provide a grid square number where you best
estimate the suspect ship to be .
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Decision Support Information
* What is Decision Support Information?
Decision Support Information is diagnostic information
provided by the system on your decision processes and that of
the system. You can access the decision support when making
your decisions on the suspect vessel's positions. (In order
to compute the information, however, the system needs at least
10 scores from you). By accessing such information, decision
makers can derive better insight into their decisions
processes. This enabl es them to revise and improve their
decisions (or positions, in this case) through a "what-if"
mode of analysis.
* How do I use Decision Support Information in Making
Decisions?
Typically. you the decision maker, would use the decision
support information as follows:
1. Make some tentative decisions (i.e., ship's
positions).
2. Ask the system for decision support information.
3. Refine your positions accordingly.
You may wish to do this 1-3 sequence within a block, as
many times (and with as many scores) as you wish.
This sequence allows you to delay asking for your accuracy
and enables you to continue to refine your positions.
* Types of Decision Support Information
(For illustrations of Decision Support Information, see
II1.G.2)
The system will provide you with the following 5 types of
decision support information:
1. INFORMATION ON YOUR DECISION RULE:
Decision makers are sometimes unable to specify
precisely, a particular decision rule (in this case, weights
assigned to specific information regarding the suspect
vessel). The system will track the weights you are using (in
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formulating your positions) and will display them through a
stacked-bar chart.
How do I use it?
1. Make sure the weights displayed are actually the
ones you want applied.
2. I f not, revise your scores, and see how the
weights change.
3. Iterate between 1-2 until the system shows
weights you actually want applied.
2. INFORMATION ON YOUR CONSISTENCY:
Sometimes, after decision makers have specified their
decision rules, they are unable to apply them consistently.
The system will calculate the scores you would have given had
you been completely consistent with your decision rule.
How do I use it?
1. Check your scores against the consistency scores.
2. Revise your scores if you need or wish to.
3. Iterate between 1-2 till your scores match with or
are close to the consistency scores.
3. INFORMATION ON THE SYSTEM'S DECISION RULE:
Instead of trying to figure out from several examples what
rule the system is using, it is more effective if it is
displayed in a bar graph format.
How do I use it?
1. Use the information to get an idea of what decision
rule the system has been following.
4. INFORMATION ON THE SYSTEM'S DECISION RULE AND YOURS
This is actually a combination of decision support
information 1 and 3. It enables you to compare your decision
rule with that of the system and thereby emulate the system
better.
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How do I use it?
1. Check weights you have given versus weights given by
the system.
2. Revise your positions if you need to.
3. Iterate between 1-2 until your weights match with or
are close to the system's weights.
5. INFORMATION ON YOUR DECISION RULE AND CONSISTENCY
This is actually a combination of decision support
information 1 and 2. The idea here is to let you revise your
weights without losing your consistency at the same time.
How do I use it?
1. Make sure the weights displayed are actually the ones
you want applied.
2. If not, revise your positions, and see how the weights
change.
3. Check your scores against the consistency scores.
4. Revise your scores if you need or wish to.






SUSPECT VESSEL SIGHTED BY FANTAIL LOOKOUT APPROX. 7 HRS. AGO,
AT




SUBJ: WX REPORT FOR 11 NOV 1991
PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES WITH WINDS FROM THE NNW AT UP TO 45 KTS,




SUBJ: CUBAN NAVAL EXERCISE ACTIVITY
CUBAN NAVAL EXERCISE UNITS SIGHTED WITHIN 20 NM OF SUSPECT
VESSEL.
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QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED AFTER COMPLETING BLOCK ONE
cognitive feedback
1. Describe (in words or equations) what decision rule you
followed in making your own estimates:
2. Distribute 100 points among the three variable you used
for reaching your overall estimate-in accordance wi th the




Cuban Naval Presence __
100 Total
3. What do you think the actual weights the system used for




Cuban Naval Presence _
100 Total
4. In this task, did you request decision support information
at any time from the system? Y N
5. If "YES", try to describe how you used decision support
information in making your decisions.
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QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED AFTER COMPLETING BLOCK ONE
outcome feedback
1. Describe (in words or equations) what decision rule you
followed in making your own estimates:
2. Distribute 100 points among the three variable you used
for reaching your overall estimate-in accordance wi th the




Cuban Naval Presence _
100 Total
3. What do you think the actual weights the system used for













YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE FIELD _
PREVIOUS OPINTEL EXPERIENCE (DUTY STATION, DATES)
ALL o THE R PREVIOUS ASS I G N MEN T S
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLS ATTENDED (NMITC BASIC, NMITC OPINTEL,ETC)_.....- _
FULL-TIME WORK EXPERIENCE (IN YEARS) _
HIGHEST DEGREE EARNED: HIGH SCHOOL__ ASSOCIATE'S__
BACHELOR'S__ GRADUATE__ OTHER (SPECIFY) _
HOW LONG AGO (IN YEARS) DID YOU COMPLETE YOUR HIGHEST LEVEL OF
EDUCATION?









•HOW MANY HOURS PER WEEK DO YOU USE COMPUTERS? _




1. How would you rank the difficulty of your task during the




4 5 6 7 8 9
very
difficult




4 5 6 7 8 9
very
clear
3. How closely does the task resemble what you do on a




4 5 6 7 8 9
resembles
very closely
4. Have you performed a similar task in the past? Y N
a. If "YES" how long ago? (in years/months) _
5. To what extent were the concepts of decision support





3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very
clear
6. To what extent was decision support information helpful in




3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very
helpful
7. To what extent was information about the ship's· actual
position helpful in improving your own decision?
123456789
Not at all Very
helpful helpful
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<8. Now that you have completed the task, can you think of any
other factor (other variables, etc) that may have influenced
you in making your decision?













11. How seriously did you take this task, generally?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not very
seriously seriously
12. How easy was this system to use?
1 2 3 4 c: 6 7 8 9..J






1. How would you rank the difficulty of your task during ,the





4 5 6 7 8 9
very
difficult




4 5 6 7 8 9
very
clear
3. How closely does the task resemble what you do on a




4 5 6 7 8 9
resembles
very closely
4. Have you performed a similar task in the past? Y N
a. I f "YES" how long ago? (in years/months ) _
5. Now that you have completed the task, can you think of any
other factor (other variables, etc) that may have
influenced you in making your decision?
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